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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING BY THE
DOMINANT FIRM: ISSUES AND PROBLEMSA CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE
D. Jeffrey Brown and PatriziaMartino*

INTRODUCTION

One of the most debated issues in antitrust law today is defining the
limits that antitrust may (or should) impose on a dominant firm.
While this issue cuts across all areas of the field, it has attracted particular attention in relation to the interface between intellectual property
(IP) rights and antitrust law. The Canadian approach to the IP-antitrust interface has been, for the most part, similar to that in the United
States. Nevertheless, there are differences, with the principal distinguishing feature of the Canadian regime being the existence of rarely
used "special remedies," namely the Competition Act' and the Patent
Act, to address certain specified "abuses" of IP rights in two Canadian
laws. 2 Otherwise, Canadian law and enforcement policy have generally viewed the mere exercise of IP rights, defined generally as unilateral conduct respecting IP, including refusals to license IP, as beyond
the scope of the provisions of the Competition Act.
In light of the above issue, this Article outlines the manner in which
Canadian competition law deals with the IP-antitrust interface from
the perspective of the relevant provisions of the Competition Act, jurisprudence, and enforcement policies of the Canadian Competition
Bureau.3

• D. Jeffrey Brown is a partner and Patrizia Martino is an associate in the Competition
Group of Stikeman Elliott L.L.P., http://www.stikeman.com. The views in this Article represent
the views of the authors alone and were presented at the DePaul University Center for Intellectual Property Law & Information Technology's (CIPLIT) 6th Annual Symposium, Intellectual
Property Licensing by the Dominant Firm: Issues and Problems.
1. Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 32 (1985).
2. Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 65 (1985).
3. The Competition Bureau, which is headed by the Commissioner of Competition, is Canada's principal competition law enforcement body.
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THE U.S. POSITION RESPECTING REFUSALS TO DEAL

A.

Generally

The intensity of the debate concerning what limits antitrust law may
(or should) impose on a dominant firm ratcheted up following the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Verizon Communications Inc. v.
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. (Trinko).4 Particular highlights of Trinko included the Court's characterization of its prior decision in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. (Aspen)5 as
"at or near the outer boundary of § 2 [Sherman Act] liability,"' 6 and
doubts raised by the Court about the existence or scope of an essential
facilities doctrine under U.S. antitrust law. 7 Neither Trinko nor Aspen
dealt with the IP-antitrust interface. Nevertheless, the controversy incited by Trinko is interesting because the approach to non-IP refusals
to deal espoused in that case is similar to that established for refusals
to license IP in In re Independent Service OrganizationsAntitrust Litigation, which affirmed the case of CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp.
(CSU). 8
A detailed discussion of these cases is beyond the scope of this Article. A brief summary of the facts and findings in these cases, however,
provides useful background to understanding the treatment of refusals
to license IP under Canadian antitrust law. The Aspen case is best
discussed in conjunction with a second case, Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Services, Inc. (Kodak),9 as the two cases have been
cited together for the proposition that proof of anticompetitive effect
is unnecessary in certain § 2 monopolization cases.
Aspen is well known for its expansive view of liability under § 2 of
the Sherman Act. 10 Together with Kodak, Aspen has been interpreted
4. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
5. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
6. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
7. Id. at 409-11.
8. 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000), affg 23 F. Supp. 2d 1242 (D. Kan. 1999).
9. 504 U.S. 451 (1992). Kodak involved an action by eighteen independent service organizations (ISOs) for violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act based on Kodak's refusal to
supply them with replacement parts for Kodak photocopiers. Id. at 455-56. Prior to the refusal,
the ISOs had purchased replacement parts for use in the servicing of Kodak copiers, putting
them in competition with Kodak. Id. at 457. The Supreme Court stated that "[i]f Kodak
adopted its parts and services policies as part of a scheme of willful acquisition or maintenance
of monopoly power, it will have violated § 2" and concluded that "[Iliability turn[ed] .. .on
whether 'valid business reasons' can explain Kodak's actions." Id. at 483 (citing Aspen, 472 U.S.
at 600-05).
10. Aspen involved a § 2 suit brought by Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. (Highlands), the
owner of a ski facility in Aspen, Colorado, after its larger competitor, Aspen Skiing Co. (Ski
Co.), refused to continue providing an interchangeable, six-day ticket that allowed access to all
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by some as establishing a rule that proof of anticompetitive effect is

unnecessary in certain § 2 monopolization cases."t According to the
so-called Aspen/Kodak rule, § 2 liability may be established using a
truncated analysis that focuses not on the competitive effects of conduct but whether conduct is supported by a "legitimate business justi-

fication. 1

2

The appropriateness of such a rule, which may attribute

liability even in the absence of proof of a causal connection between
the existence of exclusionary conduct and the creation, enhancement,
or maintenance of a monopoly, has been controversial. 13 Critics of
the Aspen/Kodak rule received an enormous boost after Trinko, which

rekindled debate about U.S. antitrust law's treatment of refusals to
deal. Trinko involved a refusal by Verizon, an incumbent monopoly
local service provider, to provide AT&T with access to its systems and
support operations, thereby allegedly impairing AT&T's ability to
provide competitive service. The plaintiffs alleged that such refusal

violated Verizon's obligations under the Telecommunications Act of
of their respective facilities at a discounted rate. Aspen, 472 U.S. at 593. At trial, a jury found
Ski Co. liable and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, citing reasons including
that "the multiday, multiarea ticket could be characterized as an 'essential facility' that Ski Co.
had a duty to market jointly with Highland." Id. at 599. The Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth
Circuit decision. Id. at 611. While recognizing that a firm with monopoly power does not have a
general duty to engage in business with a competitor, the Supreme Court noted that a monopolist's decision to decline to participate in such a program may have "evidentiary significance" in
terms of intention, which is "relevant to whether the challenged conduct is fairly characterized as
'exclusionary' or 'anti-competitive ....' Id. at 602. The Supreme Court found it significant that
Ski Co.'s withdrawal from the all-Aspen program disrupted a "pattern of distribution that had
originated in a competitive market and had persisted for several years." Id. at 603. Taking into
consideration the effect of the refusal on its smaller rival and on consumers, the Court held that
if a monopolist's conduct lacks a legitimate business justification such as efficiency, it would
presume such conduct to have had a negative impact on competition in the relevant market. Id.
at 604-05.
11. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Dir. Bureau of Econ., FFC, Promoting Innovation Competition Through the Aspen/Kodak Rule, Prepared Remarks to The George Mason University Law
Review Antitrust Symposium: The Changing Face of Efficiency (Oct. 16, 1998, rev. Nov. 12,
1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/mason1098.htm. Baker explained:
The rule may be stated as follows: a firm with monopoly power violates Sherman Act
§ 2 if it excludes rivals from the monopolized market by restricting a complementary or
collaborative relationship without an adequate business justification .... [T]he Aspeni
Kodak rule does not require proof of harm to competition; harm is inferred if the dominant firm exploits a complementary or collaborative relationship to exclude, and the
dominant firm's proffered business justification is insufficient.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
12. Id.
13. One author has noted:
Both the history of Supreme Court cases, as well as an analysis of the weak empirical
foundation of much of modern economic theory, suggest that so-called exclusionary
conduct can be condemned as monopolistic only after a full analysis, including consideration of whether the practice in fact has an anticompetitive impact.
Timothy J. Muris, The FTC and the Law of Monopolization, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 693, 695 (2000).
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1996,14 and that this violation also amounted to anticompetitive and
exclusionary conduct contrary to § 2 of the Sherman Act. In its analysis, the Court described Aspen as "at or near the outer boundary of
§ 2 liability, '1 5 and held that application of traditional antitrust principles did not justify creating a new exception to the proposition that
there is no duty to aid competitors.' 6 With respect to the "essential
facilities doctrine," the Court said that it had "never recognized such a
doctrine," and added that it saw "no need either to recognize it or to
repudiate it here."' 17 On the facts before it, however, the Court held
that the prerequisite for the doctrine, the unavailability of access to
the essential facilities, was absent in light of the provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which created an access mechanism
18
available to AT&T and other competitive local exchange carriers.
Trinko, therefore, represents a significant departure from the law as
it previously existed. Prior to Trinko, the Aspen/Kodak rule's approach to § 2 liability could be characterized as expansive insofar as
its truncated analysis, focusing on the question of legitimate business
justification rather than competitive effects, facilitated § 2 enforcement in respect of refusals to deal. Post-Trinko, the bar would appear
to be much higher in this regard, the Court signalling a far more restrictive approach to analyzing refusals to deal going forward.
B.

Refusals to License IP

To say that Trinko represented a significant departure from prior
law is true to the extent that Aspen/Kodak applied to refusals to deal
generally-outside the sphere of IP. Viewed within the sphere of IP,
however, Trinko does not represent such a significant departure.
Rather, Trinko can be viewed as extending U.S. antitrust law respecting refusals to deal to a point where such law already existed.
Trinko can be compared in this regard to the decision in CSU,19
which established that a refusal to license IP is not anticompetitive. In
this case, Xerox had established a policy of not selling parts unique to
a particular series of its photocopiers to independent service organizations (ISOs), including CSU, unless they were also end-users of the
copiers. Xerox subsequently tightened the policy, cutting CSU's di14. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C).
15. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398, 409
(2004).
16. Id. at 399.
17. Id. at 411.
18. Id. at 399.
19. 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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rect purchase of restricted parts. In order to maintain its business of
servicing Xerox equipment, CSU used parts from used Xerox equipment, other ISOs, and parts purchased through a number of its customers. CSU also obtained parts from Rank Xerox, a European
affiliate of Xerox, until Xerox forced Rank Xerox to stop selling parts
to CSU. CSU filed suit against Xerox alleging that Xerox violated the
Sherman Act by setting the prices on its patented parts higher for
ISOs than for end-users to force ISOs to raise their prices. Xerox
counterclaimed for patent and copyright infringement.
The district court found that Xerox's refusal to license was not an
unlawful attempt to leverage a "parts monopoly" into a "service monopoly" as argued by CSU.20 It also rejected CSU's argument that the

subjective intent underlying Xerox's refusal to deal was relevant in
determining the legality of Xerox's conduct. Rather, the District
Court adopted a rule of per se legality for unilateral refusals to license. 21 The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision, finding that
"Xerox was under no obligation to sell or license its patented parts
and did not violate the antitrust laws by refusing to do S0."'22 The
Federal Circuit did not exempt refusals to license IP entirely from antitrust laws, recognizing that "illegal tying, fraud in the Patent and
Trademark Office, or sham litigation" could constitute antitrust violations. 23 Absent such conduct, however, "the patent holder may enforce the statutory right to exclude others from making, using, or
selling the claimed invention free from liability under the antitrust
24
laws."
Post-Trinko, the debate in the United States continues regarding
whether the narrow reading of the Aspen decision in Trinko is indicative that U.S. courts have retreated from the expansive approach of
using antitrust to deal with the activities of monopolists. Typically,
refusals to license IP were dealt with as a discrete issue. The question
in light of Trinko becomes whether the refusals of "traditional" property are now on equal footing with refusals to license IP as not being
anticompetitive (as per the decision in CSU).

20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 1329.
Id.
Id. at 1328.
Id. at 1327.

24. Id.
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LICENSING BY DOMINANT FIRMS IN CANADA

A.

The Competition Act-Overview

In Canada, competition law is found exclusively in the provisions of
the Competition Act, which is federal legislation of general application. 2 5 Structurally, the Competition Act's provisions are divided into
two principal categories: criminal offenses and civilly reviewable matters. A third category, "special remedies," also exists and includes
§ 32 of the Competition Act, which deals with specified "abuses" of IP
rights. 2 6 A separate remedy respecting abuses of patent rights is also
27
found in the Patent Act and is discussed separately below.
The criminal provisions of the Competition Act include offenses respecting conspiracy, 28 price maintenance, 29 bid-rigging, 30 and misleading advertising and related deceptive marketing practices. 31 The
Commissioner of Competition (Commissioner) investigates complaints through the Competition Bureau (Bureau) and refers matters
to the Attorney General of Canada (Attorney General) for prosecution before the courts. Penalties for violation of the Competition
Act's criminal provisions include fines and jail terms. There is also a
limited right of private action under § 36 of the Competition Actavailable in respect of violations of the Competition Act's criminal
provisions or orders made under the Competition Act. Damages
under § 36, however, are limited to special damages (i.e., damages for
losses actually suffered); treble damages are not available.
The Competition Act's civilly reviewable provisions deal with such
conduct as abuse of dominance; 32 refusal to deal;33 exclusive dealing,
tied selling, and market restriction;34 and misleading advertising. 35 In
addition to investigating, the Commissioner "prosecutes" civilly reviewable matters before the Competition Tribunal (Tribunal) or
before the courts in certain cases (e.g., misleading advertising). Remedies for civilly reviewable matters are limited to orders prohibiting
25. R.S.C., ch. C-34 (1985).
26. Id. § 32.
27. For a more detailed overview of Canada's competition law enforcement regime, see D.
Jeffrey Brown, Introduction to Competition Law, in COMPETITION ACr AND COMMENTARY 1 (D.

Jeffrey Brown ed., 2005).
28. R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 45 (1985).
29. Id. § 61.
30. Id. § 47.
31. Id. §§ 52-55.
32. Id. § 79.
33. Id. § 75.
34. R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 77.
35. Id. § 74.01.
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the continuation of conduct and administrative monetary penalties
(AMPs) for certain civilly reviewable conduct (e.g., misleading adver-

tising and deceptive marketing practices). There is also a limited right
of private action, with leave of the Tribunal, for refusals to deal, exclu36
sive dealing, tied selling, and market restriction.
With regard to the specific issue of refusals to license IP, sections 75
(refusal to deal), 79 (abuse of dominance), and 32 (abuse of IP rights)

are the Competition Act's most relevant provisions. Each of these
provisions is discussed below, including pertinent jurisprudence and
the Bureau's enforcement policy applicable to the IP-antitrust
interface.
B.
1.

Relevant Provisions

Section 75: Refusal to Deal

Section 75 of the Competition Act is the Act's "refusal to deal"
provision. 37 Refusal to deal is civilly reviewable where, in respect of

such a refusal (i) a person is substantially affected in his or her business or is precluded from carrying on business (ii) due to his or her
inability to obtain adequate supplies of a product anywhere in a market on usual trade terms (iii) because of insufficient competition
among suppliers of the product in the market, provided that (iv) the
person is willing to meet usual trade terms of the suppliers, (v) the
product is in ample supply, and (vi) the refusal to deal is having or is
38
likely to have an adverse effect on competition in a market.
36. Remedies available in respect of civilly reviewable practices are likely to expand. Bill C19 was introduced in Parliament in November, 2004. Bill C-19, An Act to Amend the Competition Act and to Make Consequential Amendments to Other Acts, available at http://www.
parl.gc.ca/common/BillsIs. asp? lang=E& Parl=38&Ses= 1 &ls= C19& source= BillsHouse_
Government. While Bill C-19 died on the order paper with the dissolution of Parliament in the
fall of 2005, followed by a federal election and change of government in January 2006, the essential components of Bill C-19 will likely be reintroduced in some form again. If enacted, such
changes would include, among other things, very substantial AMPs for abuses of dominant position, substantial increases in AMPs for the Competition Act's deceptive marketing practices
provisions, and a provision for restitution orders against companies found to have engaged in
misleading advertising. Another potential future amendment to the Competition Act that has
been discussed but not yet reflected in proposed legislative amendments involves expanding the
right of private action in § 36 of the Competition Act to persons who suffer losses or damages as
a result of civilly reviewable conduct that is the subject of an order of the Tribunal. See Competition Bureau, Gov't of Canada, Options for Amending the Competition Act: Fosteringa Competitive Marketplace (Discussion Paper, June 2003), available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/pics/ct/ct02
584e.pdf.
37. R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 75 (1985).
38. Id.
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The two leading cases under § 75 are Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Chrysler Canada Ltd. (Chrysler)39 and Canada
(Director of Investigation and Research) v. Xerox Canada Inc.
(Xerox). 40 Neither of these cases had an IP element, although they
arguably could have given the facts-both dealt with refusals to deal
respecting proprietary parts. A third case, Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Warner Music CanadaLtd. (Warner),41 dealt
with § 75's application to a refusal to license a copyright. Each of
these cases is discussed below.
Chrysler dealt with a refusal by Chrysler Corporation's Canadian
subsidiary, Chrysler Canada, to supply automotive parts to Richard
Brunet. Brunet had opened a business in Montreal exporting automotive parts, including Chrysler, Ford, and GM parts. Although Chrysler
Canada had previously encouraged Brunet to expand the sale of
Chrysler auto parts in the export market, Chrysler Canada notified
Brunet that it would not accept new orders from him, thereby forcing
Brunet to find alternative sources of supply. Brunet approached several Montreal area dealers to secure parts, but Chrysler Canada
learned of this and instructed the dealers not to sell Chrysler automotive parts for export.
In considering whether to use § 75 to order Chrysler Canada to supply Brunet, the Tribunal defined the relevant products as proprietary
Chrysler parts and concluded that Brunet had been substantially affected in his business by virtue of his inability to obtain Chrysler parts
because of "insufficient competition among suppliers. '42 The Tribunal appeared open to accepting an efficiency argument, in particular
the consolidation of Chrysler's export business in the United States, as
a defense for the refusal to supply, but it ultimately declined to accept
this explanation because Chrysler Canada did not provide a "cohesive
explanation" of its distribution system. 43 Therefore, having found that
all of the elements of a refusal to deal under § 75 of the Competition
Act were present, the Tribunal exercised its discretion to order
44
Chrysler Canada to accept Brunet as a customer.
Xerox arose out of a decision by Xerox Canada to discontinue its
supply of ISOs, including Exdos, as part of a new policy of selling only
to end-users. As in Chrysler, the Tribunal found that the words "in39. [1989] 27 C.P.R.3d 1 (Comp. Trib.), available at 1989 C.P.R. LEXIS 1741.
40. [1990] 33 C.P.R.3d 83 (Comp. Trib.), available at 1990 C.P.R. LEXIS 1999.
41. [1997] 78 C.P.R.3d 321 (Comp. Trib.), available at 1997 C.P.R. LEXIS 1401.
42. Chrysler, 27 C.P.R.3d at 27.
43. Id. at 26.
44. Id. at 28. Such discretion derives from the permissive language of § 75, which states that
the Tribunal "may" make an order. Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 75 (1985).
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sufficient competition among suppliers of the product in the market"
included "a situation in which the product is proprietary and derives
largely from a single source. ' 45 Also as in Chrysler, the Tribunal considered whether a legitimate business justification existed for Xerox's
refusal. In the Tribunal's view, however, "it [was] abundantly clear
that the decision [to cease supplying] was taken for the very purpose
of curtailing competition in the after-sale market. '46 As a result, the
Tribunal concluded that Xerox, like Chrysler Canada before it, was
unable to rely on the legitimate business justification defense for its
47
refusal.
Both the Chrysler and Xerox decisions share common features with
the U.S. decisions in Aspen and Kodak. Such features derive in part
from the language set out in § 75 of the Competition Act at the time
of the decisions, which did not require proof of an anticompetitive
effect. 48 Thus, in both Chrysler and Xerox, the existence of a legitimate business justification and the discontinuance of a pre-existing relationship were prominent in the Tribunal's analysis, which the
Tribunal regarded as significant to whether, haying found a refusal to
deal within the meaning of § 75 of the Competition Act, the Tribunal
should exercise its discretion to order the supply of the products under
the provision.
As noted previously, IP did not frame the arguments presented to
the Tribunal in either the Xerox or Chrysler decisions, although an
argument could have been made on those grounds, as both cases involved refusals regarding proprietary parts. The potential application
of § 75 to a refusal to license IP was subsequently addressed in
Warner.49 Warner involved a refusal by certain respondents, referred
to collectively as "Warner," to grant BMG Canada copyright licenses
to make sound recordings. BMG Canada sought such licenses to compete in the mail order record club business in Canada. In a summary
judgment application, the Tribunal held that a refusal to license a cop5
yright is beyond the scope of § 75. o
In reaching its decision, the Tribunal was satisfied that, under the
Copyright Act, Warner had the exclusive right to reproduce musical
works and to make the contrivance for the performance of musical
45. Xerox, 33 C.P.R.3d at 101.
46. Id. at 119.
47. Id.
48. Prior to June 2002, § 75 of the Competition Act did not include the requirement that
refusals to deal have, or likely have, "an adverse effect on competition in a market."
49. Canada (Dir. Investigation & Res.) v. Warner Music Canada Ltd., [1997] 78 C.P.R.3d 321
(Comp. Trib.), available at 1997 C.P.R. LEXIS 1401.
50. Id. at 335.
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works. Under copyright law, Warner also had the right to refuse to
license its master recordings to BMG Canada. In his arguments to the
Tribunal against the summary judgment application, the Director (as
the Commissioner was then called) argued that "if a refusal to grant a
license is not caught by § 75, the effect will be that intellectual property rights will be seen to 'trump' competition law."'5 1 Nevertheless,
observing that a copyright license could not be in "ample supply," the
Tribunal concluded that a "license" is not a product for the purposes
of § 75 of the Competition Act:
The requirements in section 75 that there be an "ample supply" of a
"product" and usual trade terms for a product show that the exclusive legal rights over intellectual property cannot be a "product"there cannot be an "ample supply" of legal rights over intellectual
property which are exclusive by their very nature and there cannot
be usual trade terms when licences may be withheld. The right
granted by Parliament to exclude others is fundamental to intellectual property rights and cannot be considered to be anti-competitive, and there is nothing in the legislative history of section 75 of
the [Competition] Act which would reveal an intention to have secas a compulsory licensing provision for intellectual
tion 75 operate
52
property.
As a result, the Tribunal held that § 75 of the Competition Act does
53
not apply to refusals to license IP.
Two amendments to the Competition Act in June 2002 significantly
changed the application of § 75. First, a right of private action, with
leave of the Tribunal, was created in § 103.1 of the Competition Act
where the "applicant is directly and substantially affected in the applicants' business by [a refusal to supply] ... that could be subject to an
order under," inter alia, § 75.54 Second, paragraph 75(1)(e) was added
to § 75 to require that the "refusal to deal is having or is likely to have
an adverse effect on competition in a market." 55 Nevertheless, barring the overturning of Warner, § 75 is not available for addressing
refusals respecting IP licenses in any event. As Warner addressed only
the application of § 75 of the Competition Act to such refusals, however, the possibility remained that refusals to license IP rights could
be attacked under § 79 as an abuse of dominance. Section 79 of the
Competition Act, as applied to such refusals to deal, is discussed
below.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 330.
Id. at 333.
Id. at 335.
Competition Act, 2002 S.C., ch. 16 (Can).
Id.

20061
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Section 79: Abuse of Dominance

Pursuant to § 79 of the Competition Act, a firm abuses a dominant
position where it: (i) is dominant in a relevant (product and geographic) market, (ii) has engaged in a practice of anticompetitive acts,
56
and (iii) competition is thereby substantially lessened or prevented.
A nonexhaustive list of anticompetitive acts is set out in § 78 of the
Competition Act. 57 Of the enumerated acts, one deals with what
could be construed, at least in some circumstances, as a variation of
refusal to deal, in particular "pre-emption of scarce facilities or resources required by a competitor for the operation of a business, with
'5 8
the object of withholding the facilities or resources from a market.
More generally, a refusal to deal has been recognized as an anticompetitive act for purposes of § 79, creating the potential for a Canadian
version of the essential facilities doctrine under the heading of abuse
59
of dominance.
As applied to refusals to license IP, the scope of § 79's application is
limited by subsection 79(5). Subsection 79(5) of the Competition Act
exempts from application of § 79 conduct engaged in "pursuant only
to" the exercise of any right or the enjoyment of any interest derived
from specified IP statutes. 60 The principle underlying this provision
was recognized by the Tribunal in Canada (Directorof Investigation
and Research) v. Tele-Direct (Publications)Inc. (Tele-Direct), which
was principally a tied selling case but also dealt with the issue of refusal to license trademarks:
The respondents' refusal to license their trade-marks falls squarely
within their prerogative. Inherent in the very nature of the right to
license a trade-mark is the right for the owner of the trade-mark to
determine whether or not, and to whom, to grant a license; selectivity in licensing is fundamental to the rationale behind protecting
trade-marks .... The decision to license a trade-mark..,
is a right
61
which rests entirely with the owner of the mark.
The Tribunal also confirmed that a trademark owner's motivation for
refusing a license is irrelevant:
56. Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 79 (1985).
57. Id. § 78.
58. Id. § 78(1)(e).
59. See, e.g., Canada (Dir. Investigation & Res.) v. Bank of Montreal, [1996] 68 C.P.R.3d 527
(Comp. Trib.) (commonly referred to as the Interac case, which is widely regarded as an essential
facilities case). See also Competition Bureau, Gov't of Canada, Enforcement Guidelines on the
Abuse of Dominance Provisions § 4.2 (July 2001) [hereinafter Abuse Guidelines], available at
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/pics/ct/aod.pdf.
60. Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 79(5) (1985).
61. Canada (Dir. Investigation & Res.) v. Tele-Direct (Pub'ns) Inc., [1997] 73 C.P.R.3d. 1, 32
(Comp. Trib.), available at 1997 C.P.R. LEXIS 1114.
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Although the respondents may have been zealous in protecting
their trade-marks, both in refusing to license and in threatening litigation for infringement, the irrefutable fact is that the respondents
have been, through the provisions of the Trade-marksAct, accorded
the right to refuse to license their trade-marks, even selectively.
The exercise of this right is protected from being an anti-competi62
tive act by subsection 79(5) of the [Competition] Act.
With this in mind, the Tribunal recognized that the exemption contained in subsection 79(5) is not unlimited. Subsection 79(5) applies
only insofar as conduct is "pursuant only to" the exercise of an IP
right. 63 Thus, the Tribunal distinguished between a refusal to license a
trademark and a situation where anticompetitive provisions are attached to a trademark license:
The Tribunal is in agreement with the Director that there may be
instances where a trade-mark may be misused. However, in the Tribunal's view, something more than the mere exercise of statutory
present before there
rights, even if exclusionary in effect, must be
64
can be a finding of misuse of a trade-mark.
Implicit in the Tribunal's view is that a refusal to license constitutes
the "mere exercise" of an IP right, and therefore cannot be anticompetitive. Conduct going beyond this, however, including terms of a
license, may be anticompetitive and thus is susceptible to analysis
65
under the Competition Act's abuse of dominance provision.
3.

Section 32: Special "Abuse of IP" Remedy

Section 32 provides a special remedy for abuse of IP rights. It provides broad remedial powers on application by the Attorney General
to the Federal Court of Canada. Remedies include orders directing
compulsory licensing of a patent, copyright, or integrated circuit topography (but not trademarks) or, if compulsory licensing is deemed
insufficient, revocation of a patent. 66 The court may grant an order
under § 32 if it is satisfied that the conduct in question unduly prevents or lessens competition, or is likely to do so.
Notwithstanding its lengthy history as part of Canadian competition
law, having been added to the Competition Act (then the Combines
Investigation Act) in 1946,67 § 32 has been essentially moribund. Indeed, there is no jurisprudence considering its application. Two pro62.
63.
64.
65.
Act's
66.
67.

Id. at 33.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Id. This type of conduct may also be susceptible to other "general" provisions, such as the
substantive merger provision, § 92.
Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 32(2)(c) (1985).
A predecessor to § 32 was first enacted in 1910, repealed in 1937, and re-enacted in 1946.
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ceedings were commenced in the late 1960s against Union Carbide of
Canada respecting restrictive provisions in licensing agreements involving the use of patented processes and machines for the extraction
of polyethylene film from resin and treatment of such film for printing. Both cases settled without trials on the merits, with the result that
no court decisions were issued. The most substantive discussion of
§ 32 of the Competition Act, therefore, is found in the Bureau's Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines, which are discussed below.
C.

Competition Bureau's Enforcement Framework

In light of the rising importance of the IP-antitrust interface and the
paucity of Canadian jurisprudence on the subject, the Bureau sought
to clarify the relationship between Canadian IP and competition laws
with the release of the Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines
(IPEGs) in 2000.68 The IPEGs confirm the basic principles enunciated by the Tribunal in Tele-Direct, and also set out the Bureau's views
on the application of § 32 of the Competition Act.
At the time of their release, there was concern among many Canadian IP owners and legal practitioners that release of the IPEGs signalled a greater enforcement focus by the Bureau on IP going
forward. The Bureau, for its part, indicated that the IPEGs were intended only to set out the Bureau's existing enforcement policy and
that their release should not fuel concerns about a shift toward a more
aggressive enforcement approach in respect of IP.69 Indeed, the Bureau sought to reassure IP owners in the IPEGs by acknowledging the
economic benefits of IP and the exclusive statutory rights on which it
is founded, stating that IP and competition laws are complementary
(rather than conflicting, as they are often said to be) instruments of
economic policy, each seeking to promote efficiency, innovation, and
70
technological diffusion.
Consistent with this modern approach to the IP-antitrust interface,
the IPEGs state a number of propositions about the relationship between IP and competition law. For example, the IPEGs state that
"there is no presumption that an IP right confers market power or
that conduct in relation to IP is anti-competitive," and "licensing,
which serves as a mechanism for the diffusion of technology, is generally pro-competitive. 7 1a With this in mind, it does not follow that the
68. Competition Bureau, Gov't of Canada, Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines
(2000) [hereinafter IPEGs], available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/pics/ct/ipege.pdf.
69. See id. at 1.
70. Id.

71. Id. § 4.1, at 6.
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Competition Act does not apply to IP. While cognizant of its unique
characteristics, the Bureau states that the Competition Act applies to
72
IP just as it applies to other forms of property.
With respect to the manner in which the Bureau regards the Competition Act as applying to IP, it is generally consistent with the approach taken by the Tribunal in Tele-Direct. The IPEGs briefly
summarize the Bureau's approach as follows:
* The circumstances in which the Bureau may apply the Competition Act to conduct involving IP or IP rights fall into two broad
categories: those involving something more than the mere exercise of the IP right, and those involving the mere exercise of the
IP right and nothing else. The Bureau will use the general provisions of the Competition Act to address the former circumstances
and section 32 (special remedies) to address the latter.
" In either case, the Bureau does not presume that the conduct is
anti-competitive, violates the general provisions of the Competition Act or should be remedied under section 32.
" The analytical framework that the Bureau uses to determine the
presence of anti-competitive effects stemming from the exercise
of rights to other forms of property is sufficiently flexible to apply
to conduct involving IP, even though IP has important characteristics that distinguish it from other forms of property.
* When conduct involving an IP right warrants a special remedy
under section 32, the Bureau will act only in the very rare circumwhen the conduct cannot
stances described in this document and 73
be remedied by the relevant IP statute.
A threshold question, therefore, is whether conduct in respect of IP
should be analyzed using the Competition Act's general provisions or
the special remedy contained in § 32 of the Competition Act. The
answer to this question, under the Bureau's approach, depends on
what constitutes the "mere exercise" of an IP right, such conduct being beyond the scope of the Competition Act's "general provisions"
but susceptible to the application of § 32. According to the IPEGs,
the "mere exercise of an IP right" means the "exercise of the owner's
right to unilaterally exclude others from using the IP. . . . [This inPursuant to this
cludes the owner's] use or non-use of the IP . . . .
under
be
challenged
to
license
IP
cannot
approach, unilateral refusals
the general provisions of the Competition Act "no matter to what degree competition is affected" by the refusal; they can be challenged
75
only pursuant to § 32.
",74

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id. at 1-2.
IPEGs, supra note 68, § 4.2.1.
Id.
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As noted previously, this approach would appear to be consistent
with that taken by the Tribunal in Tele-Direct. A judge of the Federal
Court of Canada, however, recently expressed a different view. In Eli
Lilly and Co. v. Apotex Inc.,76 Eli Lilly claimed that Apotex infringed
eight patents of the antibiotic cefaclor, four of which had been assigned to Eli Lilly by Shinogi & Co. Apotex counterclaimed that the
assignments to Eli Lilly constituted an agreement that resulted in an
undue lessening of competition contrary to the Competition Act's
conspiracy provision, § 45. In the context of a summary judgment application, Judge Hugessen held that patent assignments fall within the
scope of a patent right, thereby exempting them from the Competition
Act.77 Judge Hugessen's decision was appealed to the Federal Court
of Appeal, which raised questions about his interpretation and application of Molnlycke AB v. Kimberly-Clark of Canada78 and sent the
matter back to Judge Hugessen for reconsideration. 79 Judge Hugessen's second decision upheld his first, maintaining that his interpretation of Molnlycke is correct and, moreover, consistent with the
analytical approach set out in the Bureau's IPEGs.8 0 Apotex appealed Judge Hugessen's second decision, and the Commissioner applied for and was granted intervener status in the proceeding. 8 ' The
76. (Eli Lilly 11),
[2004] F.C. 1445, affg Eli Lilly & Co. v. Apotex Inc. (Eli Lilly 1), [2003] F.C.
1171.
77. As Judge Hugessen stated in Eli Lilly II, "where an agreement deals only with patent
rights and is itself specifically authorized by the Patent Act, any lessening of competition resulting therefrom, being authorized by Parliament, is not 'undue' and is not an offence under section
45." Eli Lilly H, [2004] F.C. 9. In doing so, Judge Hugessen cited the proposition set out in
Molnlycke AB v. Kimberly-Clark, [1991] 36 C.P.R.3d 493 that "an undue impairment of competition cannot be inferred from evidence of the exercise of patent rights alone." Eli Lilly H, [2004]
F.C. 1 10. According to Judge Hugessen, the assignment agreement was authorized and only
dealt with the permitted assignment of patents; therefore, its effects could not be found to be
undue even though the assignment agreement would increase the assignee's market power. Id.
21.
78. The Federal Court of Appeal confirmed that Molnlycke stands for the proposition that
competition cannot be unduly impaired by the exercise of patent rights alone: "Where ...there
is evidence of something more than the mere exercise of patent rights that may affect competition in the relevant market, Molnlycke does not purport to completely preclude application of
the Act." Apotex Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., [2004] F.C.A. 232, 15.
79. See Eli Lilly II, [2004] F.C. 1445.
80. Setting aside the correctness of the first of these propositions, which will be addressed
again by the Federal Court of Appeal as a result of a further appeal filed in respect of Judge
Hugessen's second decision, Judge Hugessen's statement that his approach is consistent with the
IPEGs is surprising. The IPEGs state that only the "mere exercise" of an IP right is beyond the
scope of the Competition Act's general provisions (including § 45) and define the mere exercise
of an IP right as an owners's unilateralexclusion of others from using the IP or non-use of the IP;
nonunilateral conduct, including "[a] transfer of IP rights," in the Bureau's view, is "something
more than the mere exercise of an IP right to refuse." IPEGs, supra note 68, § 4.2.1, at 8.
81. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Apotex Inc., [2005] F.C.A. 203. According to the Commissioner's application seeking intervener status, she intends to submit that unless Parliament specifically in-
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Federal Court of Appeal allowed Apotex's appeal, concluding that
"the assignment of a patent may, as a matter of law, unduly lessen
competition" 82 and confirming the correctness of the IPEGs' approach with regard to the interface between the two statutory provisions. In this regard, the Federal Court of Appeal distinguished
Molnlycke "on the basis that it was dealing with a situation where the
only market power created by the assignment was that inherent in the
83
patent assigned."
With respect to § 32 of the Competition Act, it applies even to
"mere exercises" of IP rights, including unilateral refusals to license.
Consistent with its enforcement history, which, as noted previously,
has yielded no jurisprudence, the IPEGs state that the Bureau expects
that § 32 will be used in rare circumstances, for example, in the case of
network industries where IP protection can combine with substantial
positive effects from network size to "create or entrench substantial
84
market dominance."
According to the IPEGs, the Bureau will seek a remedy under § 32
"only if the circumstances specified in that section are met and the
alleged competitive harm stems directly from the refusal and nothing
else."'8 5 Such circumstances, the IPEGs say, "require the Federal
Court to balance the interests of the system of protection for IP (and
the incentives created by it) against the public interest in greater competition in the particular market under consideration. '8 6 To this end,
the IPEGs identify a number of criteria to be met before the Commissioner will recommend enforcement under § 32, which may be summarized as follows:
1. there is no appropriate remedy under the relevant IP statute
(e.g., § 65 of the Patent Act);
2. the impact on competition is in a market that is different or significantly larger than the subject matter of the IP (or the products that result directly from the exercise of the IP), e.g.,
a. the IP holder "is dominant in the relevant market," and
b. "the IP is an essential input or resource for firms participating
in the relevant market;"
tended to exempt conduct from a law of general competition, the Competition Act should
continue to apply. Viewed from this perspective, the Commissioner submits that § 50 of the
Patent Act will not result in the nonapplication of the Competition Act.
82. Eli Lilly & Co., [2005] F.C.A. 361, 1 14.
83. Id. 1 19.
84. IPEGs, supra note 68, § 4.2.2, at 9.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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3. the remedy would not adversely affect incentives to invest in
R&D (e.g., the refusal is stifling further innovation). 87
The Bureau's approach to § 32 is not dissimilar in form to the approach taken by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in IMS Health
GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG (IMS). 88 IMS
dealt with the rights to IMS's proprietary system for collecting and
distributing drug sales data, which divided Germany into geographical
areas and then tracked sales data on pharmaceutical products using
the geographical divisions. IMS improved its data collecting system
with the participation of users in working groups, then distributed its
database structure to the relevant users free of charge. An IMS director subsequently left the company and established a competing business, which initially used a different structure than that of IMS. The
business was unsuccessful, leading the former director to adopt a new
database structure that resembled the one used by IMS. A German
court prohibited the former director from using the IMS structure, as
it was protected by copyright, but noted that IMS could not refuse to
license the structure if such a refusal constituted an abuse of dominance under European law.8 9 Several issues were therefore referred
to the ECJ regarding under which circumstances such behavior would
be considered to be an abuse of a dominant position.
The ECJ recognized that the exclusive right of reproduction generally forms part of a copyright holder's rights, and that a refusal to
grant a license, even in the case of a dominant firm, cannot "in itself"
constitute an abuse of dominant position. 90 The ECJ did note, however, that a refusal could constitute an abuse of dominance in "exceptional" circumstances. 91 Such exceptional circumstances would arise,
according to the ECJ, where a "refusal is preventing the emergence of
a new product for which there is a potential consumer demand....
[the refusal] is unjustified [by objective considerations,] and [the refusal operates] such as to exclude any competition on a secondary
market. "92
Thus, under Canadian law, the ECJ began from the premise that a
mere refusal to license IP is not anticompetitive, but crafted a limited
exception to this rule. Moreover, the ECJ's exception is not dissimilar
to that contained in § 32 of the Competition Act, as interpreted by the
87. Id.
88. Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, 2004
E.C.R. 1-5039, available at 2004 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 166.
89. Id. 11 9-17.
90. Id. 1 34.
91. Id. T 35.
92. Id. 1 38.
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Bureau in the IPEGs. The two-part analysis that the Bureau undertakes in applying § 32 incorporates two of the three conditions that
must be fulfilled in order for the ECJ to find a refusal to license to
constitute an abuse of dominance. The third requirement, that there
be no objective justification for the refusal, does not have an express
counterpart in the Canadian approach, but it could be argued that the
assessment conducted by the Bureau to determine whether imposing a
remedy would alter the incentives to invest in research and development serves a similar function.
D. Remedies Under IP Legislation
In addition to the Competition Act, § 65 of the Patent Act contains
a special remedy in respect of abuses of patent rights. 93 The scope of
the remedy is a significant issue not only as a matter of patent law, but
also as a result of the Bureau's enforcement approach regarding § 32
of the Competition Act, an aspect that involves a requirement that
there be no remedy available under the relevant IP statute. In this
regard, there has been relatively little jurisprudence under § 65 of the
Patent Act, but a recent decision demonstrates the potential impact
that it could have if relied upon by aspiring, but rebuffed, patent
94
licensees.
Section 65 of the Patent Act provides as follows:
(1) The Attorney General of Canada or any person interested may,
at any time after the expiration of three years from the date of the
grant of a patent, apply to the Commissioner [of Patents] alleging in
the case of that patent that there has been an abuse of the exclusive
rights thereunder and asking for relief under this Act.
(2) The exclusive rights under a patent shall be deemed to have
been abused in any of the following circumstances:
(c) if the demand for the patented article in Canada is not being
met to an adequate extent and on reasonable terms;
(d) if, by reason of the refusal of the patentee to grant a license
or licenses on reasonable terms, the trade or industry of Canada or
the trade of any person or class of persons trading in Canada, or the
establishment of any new trade or industry in Canada, is prejudiced,
and it is in the public interest that a license or licenses should be
granted;
(e) if any trade or industry in Canada, or any person or class of
persons engaged therein, is unfairly prejudiced by the conditions attached by the patentee, whether before or after the passing of this
93. Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 65(1) (1985).
94. See Torpharm, Inc. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2004] F.C. 673.
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Act, to the purchase, hire, license or use of the patented article or to
the using or working of the patented process; or
(f) if it is shown that the existence of the patent, being a patent
for an invention relating to a process involving the use of materials
not protected by the patent or for an invention relating to a substance produced by such a process, has been utilized by the patentee
so as unfairly to prejudice in Canada the manufacture, use or sale of
any materials.
(5) For the purposes of this section, the expression95 "patented article" includes articles made by a patented process.
Stated briefly, § 65 sets out what constitutes an abuse of patent rights.
Section 66 of the Patent Act, in turn, provides that the Commissioner
of Patents may grant a compulsory license in cases of abuse under
96
certain circumstances.
Although there have not been many cases dealing with these provisions, the most recent is Torpharm, Inc. v. Canada (Commissioner of
Patents) (Torpharm),97 where the Federal Court allowed an appeal

from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents. The Commissioner of
Patents refused the application of Torpharm, Inc. (Torpharm) for refief based on the alleged abuse of exclusive rights under a patent pursuant to § 65 of the Patent Act. Torpharm sought a compulsory
license that would enable it to acquire a bulk chemical, lisinopril,
which at the time was subject to a patent owned by Merck and Co.,
Inc. (Merck), for the purpose of manufacturing tablets in Canada for
export. 98 After Torpharm requested a voluntary license from Merck,
Merck advised that its existing licensees in Canada were satisfying demands for lisinopril-based tablets in Canada and that it did not understand how the trade or industry in Canada would be prejudiced if a
further license was not granted. Therefore, Merck refused to grant
Torpharm a license.
The Commissioner of Patents found that, at first glance, there was
no case of abuse made under paragraph 65(2)(c) of the Patent Act,
finding that there was no evidence that Torpharm ever requested that
Merck supply it with bulk lisinopril, but had merely asked for a license. 99 The Commissioner of Patents also found a lack of evidence
that Merck had refused to supply the bulk lisinopril, nor was the Com95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 65 (1985).
Id. § 66(1)(a)-(c).
[2004] F.C. 673.
Id. [ 2.
Id. 9.
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missioner satisfied that the demand for lisinopril was not being met to
an adequate extent and on reasonable terms. 100
The Commissioner of Patents also found that there was no refusal
by Merck to grant a license on reasonable terms. 10 1 Therefore, a case
of abuse under paragraph 65(2)(d) of the Patent Act was not made.
Finally, the Commissioner of Patents refused to consider the third
ground of abuse, namely, the exercise of monopoly rights for no bona
fide purpose, as it was not one of the classes of abuse set out under
subsection 65(2).102
The Federal Court found that the Commissioner of Patents erred in
concluding there was no demand for bulk lisinopril in Canada. 10 3 The
Federal Court observed that the Commissioner of Patents had not assessed whether the repeated request for a license could constitute a
demand for the product in the circumstances of the case, where
Torpharm required a license from the patentee to use the lisinopril in
the manufacture of tablets. The Court also found, regarding paragraph 65(2)(c), that the Commissioner erred in concluding that serving foreign export markets by manufacturing tablets in Canada did
not constitute a demand for bulk lisinopril in Canada as a raw product
for use in manufacture. 10 4 Regarding the "reasonableness" determinations made by the Commissioner under paragraphs (c) and (d) of
65(2), the Court found that no such determinations could be made
without submissions from both the applicant and the patentee. Finally, the Federal Court found that the Commissioner of Patents erred
in law by concluding that the only abuses included in the Patent Act
are those described in the classes enumerated in subsection 65(2).105
Although the significance of Torpharm is limited by the fact that the
Federal Court decided only that the evidence was sufficient to warrant
a preliminary finding that a case for relief had been made, and not
that Merck had indeed abused its rights, it might be interpreted as
lowering the bar for granting compulsory licenses under 65(2)(c). The
Federal Court held that Torpharm's plans to manufacture tablets for
export using the patented product was evidence of an unmet demand
100. Id.
101. Id. 10.
102. Id. 11.
103. Torpharm, [2004] F.C. 673, 1 28-29.
104. Id.
105. The Court also held, however, that causing adverse effects upon the applicant and public
interest may not in itself constitute an abuse of Merck's exclusive rights (although such effects
would have been considered under § 65(2)(d) if other abuse were found under that provision).
Id. $ 10.
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for the product, 10 6 which implies that any applicant would have evidence that demand for a patented product is not being met due to a
mere refusal to license. Any time an applicant offers reasonable
terms and is refused, therefore, it would be entitled to obtain a compulsory license based on 65(2)(c). This is a significant change from
earlier cases, where patentees' exclusive rights were much more vigorously protected.
On the other hand, the Court in Torpharm held that industry, competitor, and public interest concerns were insufficient, of themselves,
as grounds to find an abuse of patent rights.'0 7 Before such concerns
can be raised under 65(2)(d), a preliminary abuse of rights must be
established. This interpretation is more consistent with earlier cases.
One such earlier case is Puckhandler Inc. v. BADS Industries,
Inc.,108 which involved an application by Puckhandler for a compulsory license under § 65 of the Patent Act with respect to a patent entitled "Hockey Stick Training Device." The owner of the patent, BADS
Industries, Inc. (BADS), objected to the granting of a license. As
BADS acknowledged that there was demand for the patented device
that it was unable to fulfill, the Commissioner of Patents concluded
that the criteria in paragraph 65(2)(c) of the Patent Act were satisfied. 10 9 But, the Commissioner of Patents also found that Puckhandler did not show that it was in the public interest for a license (or
licenses) to be granted, as is required under paragraph 65(2)(d). 110
Therefore, an abuse of patent rights under paragraph 65(2)(d) of the
Patent Act was not demonstrated. Paragraph 65(2)(c), however, does
not include a "public interest" requirement, and the Commissioner of
Patents went on to find an abuse under that provision."1 As a result,
the Commissioner of Patents granted Puckhandler a nonexclusive license to make, use, and sell the hockey training device at a royalty of
$1.00 per device. The Commissioner proceeded to enumerate multiple terms and conditions for the nonexclusive license.
Finally, there is Sarco Co. Inc. v. Sarco Canada Ltd.,112 an older
case that also dealt with the equivalent provisions to the current sections 65 and 66 of the Patent Act. The Commissioner of Patents refused to grant the appellant a license, under sections 67 and 68 of the
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. 1 28-30.
Id. 1 33.
[1998] 81 C.P.R.3d 261 (Patent Appeal Board), available at 1998 C.P.R. LEXIS 143.
Id. at 264.
Id.
Id.
[1969] 2 Ex. C.R. 190.
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Patent Act, to use the patented invention (steam traps). 113 The Canadian patent for the invention (TD-50) was granted to the respondent
in 1958 based on an application made by the inventor, who assigned
the patent to the appellant, who in turn assigned it back to the respondent. The appellant continued to own the U.S. patent for the invention and manufactured the traps. The appellant also began
manufacturing and distributing an improved trap (TD-52) in the
United States for which the appellant also held a patent. The appellant was able to receive a patent for the improved invention in Canada; however, as it was within the scope of the respondent's patent,
this prevented the appellant from making or selling the improved
traps in Canada.
According to the court, there was an arrangement between the respondent and the appellant that they would cooperate regarding certain aspects of their operations. The appellant provided the
respondent with access to the technical literature, engineering assistance, and know-how for the products it manufactured, and the appellant would act as a source of supply to the respondent for products it
did not manufacture. After the death of the owner of the Canadian
company, however, relations between the appellant and the respondent deteriorated. The respondent began inquiring about manufacturing the traps in Canada, but the appellant made clear that it was
opposed to the idea. Therefore, from the time the steam traps were
first produced until late 1963, the Canadian market was supplied by
traps manufactured by the appellant in the United States and imported into Canada by the respondent.
For the next few years, a very small percentage of the traps were
manufactured by or for the respondent in Canada. When the appellant learned of the respondent's activities, the appellant launched its
application for a compulsory license under the patent. The court
found that there was no reason why the traps could not have been
produced at a profit in Canada to supply the Canadian market.' 1 4 The
court held that the invention was "not worked in Canada on a commercial scale" and that without a satisfactory reason, the failure to
work the patent "on a commercial scale" in Canada constituted an
abuse of the exclusive right under the patent within the meaning of
paragraph 67(2)(a) of the Patent Act.11 5 Therefore, the issue to be
determined in the case was whether the facts provided a "satisfactory
113. Id. at 191.
114. Id. at 197.
115. Id.
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reason" for the nonworking of the patent in Canada. 116 Judge Thurlow found that there was "no legal, technical or economic impediment
to the working of the invention in Canada and the failure to manufacture on a commercial scale during this period had been the result of
the respondent's decision or decisions to import rather than to manufacture. ' 117 Based on the evidence, Judge Thurlow found that the
Commissioner of Patents erred in finding that there had been no
abuse of the patent under paragraph 67(2)(a). 118
Clearly, the court's interpretation of paragraph 67(2)(a) effectively
diminished patentees' exclusive rights. This provision, however, was
repealed in 1993,119 which arguably reduced the extent to which competition concerns are protected in the Patent Act. In dealing with paragraph 67(2)(d) of the Patent Act, there were five separate incidents
that the appellant attempted to rely on to demonstrate a refusal to
grant a license on reasonable terms. 120 Although the five incidents
demonstrated reluctance on the respondent's part to consider granting
the appellant a license, Judge Thurlow found that there was no actual
evidence that indicated the refusal of a license on reasonable terms in
121
either the application or the affidavit.
Nevertheless, Judge Thurlow went on to consider the possibility
that the conduct of the respondent was viewed as a refusal to license
on reasonable terms. If that were the case, Judge Thurlow stated, the
follow up issue to be determined was whether it had been proven that
"the establishment in Canada by the (appellant) of a new trade or
industry is prejudiced thereby."'1 22 Thurlow held that the TD-52 trap
is a substitute for the TD-50 trap. 123 Therefore, the manufacture of
the TD-52 trap by the appellant in Canada would be the entry of a
new trader into the existing trade of steam traps in Canada and not
the "establishment of a new trade or industry in Canada" as required
by the statute. 124 Based on the above, Thurlow held that there was no
25
abuse within the meaning of paragraph 67(2)(d).1
116.
117.
118.
119.
(Can.).
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id. at 202.
Sarco, [1969] 2 Ex. C.R. at 202-03.
North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 1993 S.C., ch. 44, § 196
Sarco, [1969] 2 Ex. C.R. at 203-08.
Id.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 212.
Id.
Id.
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Although Thurlow had found an abuse established under subsection
67(2)(a), the appeal was dismissed based on the further finding that
the applicant (appellant) only applied for a license when it found out
that the respondent was manufacturing in Canada despite its efforts to
stop the respondent.12 6 Thurlow held that if a license was granted to a
person who has been attempting to prevent the manufacture of the
patented item in Canada, the result would be to encourage those who
want to serve the Canadian market for a patented article with goods
of foreign manufacture.1 2 7 Therefore, the granting of a license would
amount to a reward for promoting the abuse of a patent and would
encourage those who seek to avoid the manufacture of patented items
in Canada.
These cases highlight the importance of considering possible remedies that exist under IP legislation when discussing the interface between IP rights and antitrust. They also emphasize the importance of
not dealing with IP rights solely from the perspective of IP or antitrust
but keeping in mind the interface between the two areas of law.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The interface between IP rights and antitrust in Canada is an issue
of particular interest in the broader debate in antitrust today-defining the limits that antitrust may (or should) impose on a dominant
firm. Canadian law and enforcement policy have generally viewed the
mere exercise of IP rights, defined generally as unilateral conduct respecting IP, including refusals to license IP, as beyond the scope of the
general provisions of the Competition Act. While this position has
been adopted by both the Tribunal and the Bureau, limited jurisprudence in this area means there is some risk that an alternative interpretation may arise.
In comparison to the United States, the debate regarding the interface between IP rights and competition law in Canada has changed
due to the existence of § 32 of the Competition Act and § 65 of the
Patent Act, which allow for "special remedies" to address specified
"abuses" of IP rights. The Canadian approach differs in this regard
from that in the United States, where the balance appears to have
shifted strongly in favor of IP laws through the adoption of a rule of
per se legality for refusals to license IP in the wake of the CSU decision. Even if Canadian law and enforcement policy adopt an approach that is generally similar to that taken in CSU, such an
126. Sarco, [1969] 2 Ex. C.R. at 214.
127. Id.
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approach only applies to the extent that conduct could attract enforcement attention under the Competition Act's general provisions. Section 32 of the Competition Act could still apply (even if, as a practical
matter, the scope of its application has been minimal), thereby providing a potential "stop-gap" measure in the event of anticompetitive
uses of IP rights, the existence of which is lacking in U.S. antitrust law.
The same is true of section 65 of the Patent Act, another rarely used
provision that provides additional remedies in respect of certain
abuses of patent rights and that has no counterpart in U.S. patent law.
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